This interview is part of our series on Canada’s infrastructure moment and its impact on the geospatial/geomatics sector.
“If you’re not an incumbent, you can’t even get in the door.” That’s how Will Cadell sums up Canada’s procurement crisis. As the CEO of Sparkgeo, a Canadian geospatial innovator punching above its weight in the global arena, Cadell has spent over a decade navigating a system that routinely locks out homegrown innovators.
For Canadian tech companies, no matter how capable, public sector opportunities are often out of reach — blocked by procurement processes that favour familiar vendors and outdated requirements.
Now, as Canada pledges to spend more on critical infrastructure, the question looms: will Canadian firms finally get a fair shot? Or will the same barriers like procurement complexity, bias toward incumbents, and siloed systems, continue to stifle innovation?
In this bare-all conversation, Cadell unpacks what’s broken in Canada’s procurement landscape, how resume-based contracting kills innovation, and why it’s time to treat departments — and vendors — like adults.
Canada is committing 1.5% of GDP to infrastructure and civil preparedness. Do you think our procurement systems are ready for that kind of scale and urgency?
No, I don’t think Canadian procurement systems are ready. I applaud the idea that Canada should spend significant sums on infrastructure and civil preparedness. We’re seeing changes in our climate that are forcing us to think about infrastructure renewals. Municipalities are struggling with water management. The presence and absence of water is becoming critical.
Supply chains and logistics are also now critical subjects. As our climate changes, we’re going to see more extreme events, and that’s going to affect how we manage our logistics. We need routes that are robust, that are even anti-fragile. Routes that allow us to work around problem areas if and when they occur.
That takes planning and risk management. For a country our size, those are geographic problems. And yet, geography isn’t being brought into these conversations in the way it should. Those of us who are digital geographers, working with spatial data, should be part of this, whether it’s monitoring, planning, or executing.
From a procurement perspective, my experience with federal procurement doesn’t give me much confidence. I don’t think we’re in a good place to move quickly.
Since the ArriveCan debacle, procurement has become even more difficult. People are afraid to make decisions. There’s a fear of allowing something to happen that “shouldn’t” happen. But procurement wasn’t moving quickly even before ArriveCan.
The system is problematic. I don’t think the federal government can buy what it needs in a way that’s both easy and reliable. So, while this infrastructure opportunity is huge and essential, our procurement systems are not ready.
How did ArriveCan impact trust — in both the procurement process and the tech sector?
ArriveCan was an unmitigated disaster. You’re talking about $50 million going to a three-person team. That should never have happened. Even with the chaos of COVID, that’s an indefensible outcome.
Meanwhile, there are capable Canadian companies being blocked from even bidding on projects because of arbitrary resume requirements or process hurdles. It’s ridiculous.
What you have is two systems running in parallel:
- One that lets absurd, unjustifiable spending happen without scrutiny.
- Another that blocks small, capable firms over bureaucratic minutiae.
It’s disheartening. Vendors lose faith. They stop bidding. The system becomes a closed loop. And that kills innovation.
The worst part? The public loses faith, too. They assume all government tech projects are a waste of money. That makes it even harder for real innovators to break through.
What are the key barriers that you’re seeing?
There are several. One is the boilerplate language that gets written into contracts. It’s often completely out of touch with how real companies operate. For example, contracts will say the government needs to know exactly who will be working on a project upfront.
As a small tech company, I can’t give you that. I don’t know what my staffing situation will be in six months. I don’t know what talent needs to be where. So, I’m left with three choices:
- I could lie and give them a fixed list of names, knowing full well it’ll change later.
- I could tell the truth and say, “This requirement is unreasonable. We can’t give you exact names right now, but we’ll guarantee the right resources.”
- Or I could send the resumes of my entire company and say, “Pick who you like from here.”
None of these options is good. What we need is for the Government of Canada to accept that the resume of an organization, our track record, our IP, and our team capability is sufficient.
But that’s not how it works. What we’ve created is an environment where prime companies, such as large service organizations, just rent resumes. They don’t retain internal IP. They don’t build internal capabilities. MDA is an exception. But for most, it’s just resume shopping.
So, what happens? We’re not building Canadian primes or reusable IP. We’re not growing companies that have internal capability. Government investment isn’t being used to create sustainable, scalable Canadian expertise.
Instead, we’ve created an army of gig workers. They’re grouped together by contracting firms, but there’s no long-term organizational capability. And that’s bad for the individuals, bad for the Canadian tech economy, and ultimately bad for the taxpayer.
Is this because the government believes Canadian companies aren’t good enough? Or is it just inertia in the system?
I think it’s both. It’s a lazy bias. It’s easier to default to the companies that have big marketing budgets. The ones that show up with slick proposals and a lot of noise.
But it ignores Canada’s history. Montreal used to be the number one place in the world for AI. Waterloo still produces incredible graduates. BC has a long history of geospatial excellence – some of the most important companies in our space came out of BC.
We may be vast geographically, but we’re small in population. We can’t be the best at everything. But we can be exceptional at the things we choose to focus on. To say “Canada isn’t good at tech” is just lazy. Success isn’t about national capacity, it’s about the environment we create for innovation.
If the Canadian government bought more Canadian products and were willing to invest in Canadian innovation, we’d see a different landscape.
But right now, it’s easier for us to sell technology to the Middle East than to the Canadian government. That’s bananas. It’s not about capability — it’s about access. Canadian companies are being denied access due to a broken system.
Do you think this is partly risk aversion from procurement teams – that they’re afraid of new things?
Definitely. People say no in all kinds of ways. Sometimes it’s, “Oh, we need this extra feature.” Sometimes it’s, “That’s too expensive.” Sometimes it’s a straight-up delay. But often, the stated reason is not the actual reason.
The actual reason is usually internal. Maybe they don’t have the budget, or staff to manage the project, or the necessary clearances. Or maybe they know that if they engage with a new system, they’re going to open a box of frogs.
Especially with IT projects, they know things will get messy. They’ll have to confront how old and creaky their existing systems are. And no one wants to pay for bad news. You don’t want to fund a report that tells you your infrastructure is broken.
Instead of facing that, they find other ways to say no. Saying “Canadian companies aren’t ready” is a convenient excuse. It shifts the problem away from internal issues to an external narrative.
Do procurement teams even have the capacity or technical know-how to evaluate digital solutions fairly?
I don’t have inside knowledge, but based on observation, I’d say capacity is a huge issue. If we’re moving towards spending 5% of GDP on defence and 1.5% on infrastructure, procurement is going to be overwhelmed.
Even before, procurement processes were taking way too long. Now, with more money flowing, they simply don’t have enough people to handle it. Whether or not they have the technical expertise, they certainly don’t have the bandwidth.
And this is where big companies have the advantage. They have teams dedicated to writing proposals, preparing compliance documents, legal teams, everything. Small companies like us are focused on building the actual product. We don’t have the overhead to play that paperwork game at scale.
So, procurement ends up defaulting to what’s easiest. That’s often the big incumbents, even if they’re not the best solution.
What’s really at stake here for Canadian innovation?
It’s massive. This is a huge opportunity for Canada to build domestic capacity. But if we don’t fix procurement, we’ll just miss out. Canadian companies can go toe-to-toe with anyone globally. But they need a fair shot. The problem is, we’re being asked to compete in a system that isn’t designed to give us access.
I’ve heard people say, “If you hire Canadians, that’s Canadian enough.” But that’s a low bar. We should be building Canadian IP, Canadian companies with long-term capability.
But what happens instead? Procurement defaults to the vendors they already know. Because that’s easier. They’ve used them before. It’s low-risk. And when procurement teams are stretched, they take the path of least resistance.
That stifles innovation. And it’s why Canadian companies often end up selling their best products to foreign governments. We’re building cutting-edge tech and exporting it, while being locked out of Canadian public sector opportunities.
What would you recommend to fix this?
We need a procurement task force — someone who can step away from the politics and focus purely on execution. Departments like CAF, NRCan, Public Safety know what they need. They’re the ones closest to the problem. They should be empowered to define their requirements and purchase accordingly.
But right now, Shared Services Canada is a bottleneck. It forces non-experts to make technical purchasing decisions. The people writing the contracts aren’t the ones using the systems. That creates huge gaps.
So, if you were on a contract vehicle before Shared Services came in, you’ve been coasting ever since. The system hasn’t changed. There’s no incentive to change. That’s been great for incumbents. They’ve had a free ride for over a decade. But it’s devastating for innovation. New companies can’t get a foot in the door. And when they do, they’re competing against paperwork, not capability.
That’s not how you build a robust tech ecosystem. That’s not how you foster innovation. And it’s not how you get value for taxpayer dollars. It slows down Canadian innovation and forces us to look elsewhere — to the U.S., Europe, the Middle East. We build great products, but we’re selling them to other governments because we can’t sell to our own.
It’s tragic, actually. We’re exporting innovation that should be strengthening Canadian public services. We’re helping other countries build the future while we’re stuck in the past. And it’s not because we lack capacity. It’s because our procurement processes make it impossible to participate.
Do you think fragmentation across federal, provincial, and municipal procurement makes things worse?
Maybe. Fragmentation always creates inefficiencies. But decentralization can also build resilience. It’s important that provinces and municipalities can set their own priorities. The bigger issue, in my view, is fragmentation within the federal government itself. Shared Services was supposed to fix that, but I think it’s added layers of bureaucracy instead.
We’ve created a situation where everyone is accountable, but no one has authority. That’s not a recipe for good outcomes.
Let’s talk about workforce issues. Many people in the industry are saying they can’t find enough skilled workers, but at the same time, programs are shutting down. What’s happening?
It’s bizarre, isn’t it? On one hand, we’re hearing, “We don’t have enough people.” On the other hand, educational programs are closing because of “lack of demand.” And then there’s this third narrative that AI is going to take everyone’s jobs.
All three of those can’t be true at the same time. If we genuinely have a workforce shortage, programs should be expanding, not closing. If AI is going to take over, we need to retrain people, not shut down pathways.
I think what’s happening is that only certain parts of the geospatial value chain are being affected. For example, in surveying, you still need boots on the ground. You need qualified people in the field. If we’re not training enough of those people, that’s a real problem.
However, for other areas of geospatial, analytics, visualization, and data management, we might be able to achieve more with fewer people if we provide them with better tools. That’s where AI can augment the workforce.
It’s not about replacing people. It’s about augmenting them and helping small teams do more with less. That’s a conversation we should be having, but we’re not.
Do you think part of the problem is that education and workforce planning are still based on outdated occupation codes? The NOC system still lists traditional roles like land surveyors but ignores the drone operators, AI analysts, Lidar specialists…?
Absolutely. The job I have now didn’t exist when I was in university. Jobs change. They always have. But our workforce planning systems haven’t caught up. If we’re tying funding and program approvals to outdated job codes, we’re setting ourselves up for failure. We’re not training people for the jobs that exist.
That said, I’m also a bit of a free-market guy. If a program lacks demand, it may need to evolve or even shut down. But if the lack of demand is being driven by bad classifications, then we’re missing the point.
Maybe we don’t need as many manual digitizers anymore. But we do need drone operators. We do need people who can manage AI workflows. The jobs are there. We’re just not preparing for them.
I’ve seen some good examples. Our local university built a geospatial program. They’re not training people to push buttons on a legacy platform. They’re teaching students to code, to pull in diverse data sources, to work in Python notebooks.
We’re moving into a world of GIS without a GUI. Spatial analysis occurs in scripts and data workflows, not in traditional desktop software. That’s where the field is going.
And that’s great. The core principles of spatial reasoning and geographic thinking remain fundamental. The tech will change daily. But the underlying logic stays the same. We should be building programs that teach those principles and give students the tools to apply them in whatever context comes next.
Any final thoughts on how we should rethink the geospatial field?
We should be excited about how the field is evolving. But we should also challenge some of our sacred cows. Take projections and coordinate systems. We’ve always thought in terms of flattening the Earth onto a 2D surface. But what if we didn’t have to? What if we all agreed on a discrete global grid and skipped projections entirely?
That would change how we think about spatial data. For some, that’s existential. But it’s also an opportunity. The fundamental question remains: Where is something? How do we get to it? How do we move through space?
Those are the problems we solve. The tools will change. The workflows will evolve. But the core logic stays the same.
I’m hopeful. I believe Canada has the talent, the companies, the expertise. But we need to fix procurement. We need to fix workforce development. And we need to trust Canadian firms to build the future — not just abroad, but here at home.

Be the first to comment