Real-Time GNSS Networks Operators: Be Wary Suspicious of Users

Some individuals or firms, sometimes under false pretenses, are attempting to profit from the infrastructure that you, your partners, and legitimate users have built. The good news is this is not frequent, and they are easy to spot and block.

If you do not operate an RTN, the following might be a bit of a bore. If you do operate an RTN read on… And if you are an “RTN pirate”, we’re on to you…

Real-Time GNSS Networks (RTN), sometimes referred to as Network RTK (NRTK) and other names (depending on various correction formats supported), are like a utility. Sometimes public and free, or public and for-fee (on a cost-recovery basis), or public cooperative, or public-private cooperative—there are many models. Not counting small, closed networks (e.g., at mining sites), there are thousands of RTNs worldwide, ranging in size from 5-10 stations each to those encompassing thousands of stations and entire countries.

They serve as a utility (delivering correction services), enabling high precision applications: surveying, mapping, construction, public safety, agriculture, etc., and scientific research.

Why would folks want to access data from RTN under false pretenses? It is because the data can be of high value, bringing a decent ROI—especially if they somehow manage to get it for free.

For a little background, let’s look first at various types of RTN

Navigation-Grade RTN

RTNs vary in how they are built, how they are operated, how they deliver corrections, and expected results. For example, there is a huge wave of networks that support PPP and PPP/RTK hybrid services nationally and globally, to compete in the budding vehicular autonomy market. For many of these, a decimeter or more is sufficient for their end users’ needs These are legit, and valuable RTN.

Asset Mapping-Grade RTN

There are growing global networks (mostly single-base type RTK) that serve asset mapping type applications. Some of these have encouraged local people to set up inexpensive (but in some cases, perhaps, too inexpensive) bases to add and incentivize this by sharing revenue from crypto mining. There’s nothing wrong with that aspect, but in some cases the latter seems to be more of a priority than any aspect of geodetic quality. Remember, anyone can say “centimeter” results, but that might not be a repeatable user experience, unless they are standing next to the “base” in perfect, clear sky conditions. But all that aside, those are also  legit and valuable RTN.

Geodetic-Grade RTN

There are RTN that were designed and built to meet geodetic needs, for example, the various public and/or private RTN that cover (or have substantial footprints) in 49 of the 50 US states. In a way, these are the gold standard in RTN. A lot of time, money, resources, and effort have gone into building truly geodetic-grade networks of continuously operating reference stations. No “thousand buck” stations can deliver the quality these RTN provide for surveying, engineering, construction, and more. Many state or regional RTN serve as an direct extension of geodetic, nation spatial reference systems.

Therefore, the high-quality observations and corrections can be quite valuable, and that is why there are legitimate partnerships with other types of RTN (that provide non-competing services). For example, providers of global precise point positioning (PPP) services may contract with geodetic RTN to obtain observation data from a handful of sparse stations to help build better regional iono models to add to their PPP deliverables. This is mutually beneficial, the PPP service is non-competing (aimed at vehicular autonomy), and the RTN gets some revenue or other investments/services-in-kind.

Other types of non-geodetic networks are not as successful in demonstrating to geodetic RTN,  the mutual benefits of partnering. They are almost without exception unwilling to pay for station observations and are not willing to observe prohibitions on competing services. Sometimes, they float the idea of sharing data from their stations to augment an existing RTN. Typically, they do not offer geodetic-grade receivers or antennas, have sketchy mounts, non-redundant comms, and inconsistent support/maintenance resources. On one end of the scale, for example, any tinkerer like me could build (and I did for fun), for under $1,000, a base (with a mass-market  consumer-grade GNSS board) and even a home-built antenna. It worked, but definitely not geodetic-grade. I could have sent that antenna off to be modelled by the IGS, duct tape it to my chimney, set up my own meme coin mining, and sell corrections that I can say are “four-constellation centimeter!” There are some of these networks that are taking quality and performance considerations much more seriously now, which is a good sign. However, for reasons previously stated, partnering with them is still not a very attractive prospect for geodetic-grade RTN.

RTN Pirates

Who are RTN operators to judge what someone wants to do with the corrections? If the end use is not a potential threat to public safety, are there reasons to deny access? For the most part , no. But, if the end use poses a threat to the RTN, yes. They may be providing direct competition for subscriptions or other funding sources, or if their usage clogs up the NTRIP casters. Or if they misrepresent the clauses of standard RTN end-user agreement disclaimers about fitness for purpose, that can point liability for misuse by 3rd parties back on the RTN. What if someone reprocessed and resold your corrections to a robo-taxi company, claiming global “centimeter” precision, and then your RTN gets sued when the inevitable accidents occur?

Folks want to profit from the RTN infrastructure, get its value for free, and sell it to others. Or use your data to augment their R&D and corrections services, profiting from that.

In recent conversations with RTN operators across North America and other countries, we’re seeing very similar disturbing patterns when folks try to “shoplift” from RTN. That’s not to say there are no legitimate requests for testing purposes (we’ll discuss that later), but if someone needs to provide false contact info.. that is not cool.

How To Spot Them

  1. Multiple signups. If your RTN has a self-registration portal (not always a good idea), you need to look for folks signing up for multiple logins all at once. If your RTN does not have a self-registration portal, but instead requires an email request, asking for multiple logins up front can be a red flag.
  2. Bogus Contact Info. At a minimum, most RTN ask for a contact email, physical address, and company name. Some also ask for the reason they are making the request (e.g., end use). The latter helps in several ways; it helps identify bogus users and identifies uses that may not be supportable by the RTN, or could set the RTN up for additional heightened liability (I could provide examples of some real doozies, but let’s move on).

If you suspect something is off, checking the phone number is an easy way to find out if they randomly grabbed one from a Google search to make it look like they are a local firm (as many of the RTN pirates operate from overseas or VPN). Same with the street address. If you find out the phone belongs to say a barbershop, but the address points to a dental clinic, this is a red flag. One of my favorites is an outfit that requested multiple accounts under many different names, and they operate (among many things) a crypto scheme out of the Middle East, but they go through one of those shell companies in Wyoming.

One tactic to determine if they are legit is to shut off access and see if they contact you. Then ask them to explain the discrepancies. Mostly, there will be no response, or you might see a request from another bogus user.

  1. Usage Log Activity. If you see 24/7 connections, that could be an indicator of someone pulling corrections for resale, or derivation of their own corrections for sale. A RTN corrections stream of RTCM3.x, can be ingested by other systems as observations to create other downstream solutions. This is a very common form of RTN pirating.

In an example of a user who says they have just bought, or are developing an autosteer tractor, and just want to do some testing, the logs might reveal otherwise. If your RTN supports a live user map (that the RTN operator can view), it could show a user who has, for example, been logged in to multiple stations 24/7, around the state, but none of the “rovers” or “tractors” have moved at all.

There are folks that may not be acting out of malice, but from misconceptions about what is or is not prohibited. They might think, or have been lead to think, that lifting corrections from an RTN for free, and passing it along to a service (they don’t realize is competing) or crypto mining scheme, is not only Ok, but can make them quick money. If you explain things to them, they almost always get it. Some also act out of lack of knowledge of the basics of how GNSS and corrections work.

One earnest fellow contacted several RTN with an interesting proposal. And we’d seen several similar proposals via emails. He was busy putting up some low cost stations for a shake-and-bake network and wanted to add hundreds of existing geodetic stations from RTN. He alternately proposed adding his stations to the RTN, but it was noted that he was putting them in any places where the RTN already had stations, and that none of his stations would meet geodetic-grade RTN standards. He then said they’d make the RTN better because the crypto mining made everything more precise. I’d love to hear the pseudo-science he was fed to believe that. He then switched back to proposing adding every RTN station to his network, everyone would get rich off the crypto mining. He was surprised to hear that for publicly operated elements of RTN, the use of public infrastructure for such mining is almost universally prohibited. Earnest, but misguided.

  1. Location Limitations. Many IT systems that support RTN already block access from foreign countries. For example, most RTNs in the U.S. block access from outside of the U.S. and Canada. There are, though, legitimate exceptions. Some field equipment vendors, like precision agriculture systems, require users to authenticate or route data through vendor data centers that might be overseas. IT departments can add firewall exceptions for those specific endpoints. However, RTN pirates have lots of ways to circumvent location restrictions. They can sometimes successfully route through a VPN, or they buy some local cloud space, cooking it in their “pirate GNSS meth lab”, into something they can sell as their own. IT location restrictions will block nearly everything, but you might need to still keep an eye on things (per items 1-3).

Strategies

  1. If you suspect something is awry, temporarily disabling access and waiting to see if they immediately contact you is a very common method RTN operators employ. The downside is that if you are mistaken, you might be disrupting the field operations of a legitimate end user.
  2. Contact the user and put on your Lt. Columbo hat… “Just one more thing…. How come your phone number is Luigi’s Barbershop in Akron, but your street address is a White Castle in Columbus?” Your RTN is a valuable service that you’ve only been able to provide through earnest efforts and transparency. Is it too much to expect your end users to demonstrate at least some of that?
  3. Contact peer RTN operators. Ask if they’ve been seeing the same kinds of dubious login requests. If fact, it was an email circulation over the past few days that prompted this article; we’d all discovered the same bogus user. Some research revealed that it was a GNSS developer overseas. Whether they are doing any legitimate business or not, presenting false information to obtain access raises too many red flags. In North America, there is an RTN operators’ group (NARNO) that meets online regularly, with similar groups in other regions of the world, and other groups by RTN software brand. Word gets around. I’d like to see a global RTN forum (for geodetic-grade RTN at least). Peer RTN can be very helpful to each other.
  4. If a “global RTK network” proposes partnering, make sure they are very clear on what the mutual benefit would be, and demand transparency. One of these networks keeps contacting RTN, proposing sharing of station data. When you note that your RTN already has good coverage and does not really need more stations, but may consider some for redundancy, ask for a map and station datasheets. They usually push back and say they don’t make that public. But by looking at their low res map of “coverage” and the circular regions around where the stations would be, it looks like this overseas company does not actually operate any stations in our part of North America. Instead, tapping the free (for now) data streams from scientific networks. In this case they were tapping the Earthscope Plate Boundary Observatory (aka PBO) network of 1300+ stations in the western U.S. and Alaska. Big news for them: the PBO network host, Earthscope, will begin to charge (if they have not already) for commercial use of data streams.
  5. Delete! There is something very satisfying in deleting a bogus user. Huzzah!

Legitimate Requests

There are folks who are engaged in legitimate R&D for various GNSS-based applications, and an RTN can be valuable to test. Often, they want to simply test results with and RTK or NTRK connection, briefly. And if an RTN covers a large area, they can test in various conditions. This can, sometimes, be mutually beneficial. For instance, they might offer to pay a small amount for the service, or offer reference station infrastructure, or services in-kind. Legit requests come with full transparency

There are many services being developed for the nascent vehicular autonomy market (often PPP or hybrid, which are not directly competing with standard RTN services) and many of these firms seek to partner with local RTN. Having a signed agreement, stating clearly the restrictions on what they can do wit the RTN data is a good idea.

The RTN Community

RTNs are a valuable utility and amenity and deserve respect for the tireless efforts that go into putting them together and operating them. The end-user communities RTN serve are a valuable and integral part of RTN ecosystems, and almost without exception, users are great partners; reliable and responsible—without great users, RTN could not function. However, unscrupulous interlopers are not welcome.

Gavin Schrock

Gavin Schrock

Gavin Schrock, PLS is a surveyor, technology writer, consulting editor for GoGeomatics, and operator of a cooperative GNSS network (RTN). He has worked in surveying, mapping, data management, GNSS, and GIS for more than three decades in the civil, utility, defense, and mapping disciplines. He has published in these fields and has taught these subjects at local, state, national, and international conferences

View article by Gavin Schrock

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